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Nondisclosure as a Contract 
Remedy: Explaining the 
Advance-Notice Puzzle 
John T. Addison, University of Hull and University of 
South Carolina 
John B. Chilton, University of South Carolina 
Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice 
contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present 
model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate 
their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to 
job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice 
and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium 
contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Man- 
dating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce 
it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive, 
there are cases in which it harms all parties. 
I. Introduction 
Empirical evidence suggests that workers who receive advance notice 
of impending job loss have significantly lower jobless duration than their 
nonnotified counterparts (for a tabular survey of the literature, see Addi- 
son and Portugal [1992]). The shorter spells of unemployment of notified 
workers are accounted for almost entirely by job finding during the notice 
interval, part of which takes the form of early quits (Ehrenberg and 
Jakubson 1989). Such "premature" quits, and other forms of worker exit 
behavior, presumably play a part in explaining why notice is not freely 
given. Indeed, less than 15% of displaced workers receive formal written 
notice (Addison and Blackburn 1994). If notice is so valuable to workers, 
[Journal of Labor Economics, 1997, vol. 15, no. 1, pt. 1] 




the puzzle is why we do not observe more contractual arrangements in 
which workers pay for the right to be notified via lower wages. 
Previous theoretical work rests on a contractual commitment or en- 
forcement failure attributed to notice contracts (Deere and Wiggins 1988; 
Kuhn 1992). In this view, a firm may very well want to guarantee its 
workers advance notice, but most firms cannot do so because they lack 
the means to enforce that promise. In particular, most firms do not prom- 
ise notice because their workers foresee that they would (subsequently) 
renege to avoid the damage of premature quits. The firm commitment- 
failure models thus use the presence of circumstances likely to facilitate 
self-enforcement (e.g., a large multiplant firm with a reputation to main- 
tain, or a union which would economize on worker litigation costs) to 
predict whether a firm adopts notice. The presumption of these models 
is that a government mandate to give notice simply enforces a commit- 
ment not to engage in opportunistic behavior that firms are willing but 
may be unable to achieve on their own. 
In this article, we embrace the reverse case and argue that the commit- 
ment problem applies to workers and not firms who can freely choose 
to commit to provide advance notice.1 We show that there exist conditions 
in which a firm would find a no-notice contract superior to an advance- 
notice contract and other conditions in which the reverse is true. Our 
model thus addresses both the frequency of voluntary notice agreements 
and employer opposition to mandated notice. There are three central 
results of our analysis. First, where the notice mandate binds, thereby 
harming the firm, there exist some circumstances in which the worker 
benefits and others where the worker loses. Second, should the mandate 
benefit workers, it is never possible for their gains to exceed the losses 
incurred by firms. Finally, there are conditions under which a firm volun- 
tarily adopts notice even though there exist alternative no-notice contracts 
with the property that the gains to workers would exceed the loss to the 
firm, resulting in an overprovision of notice. 
The key to understanding these results is that workers make their quit 
decisions without regard to the costs imposed on firms. For the firm, 
providing less information is a low-cost means of dealing with this moral 
' Although it may explain why some firms do not offer advance notice, our 
position is that in many cases the cost of enforcing notice contracts is not the 
overriding issue. Most plant closures are not associated with bankruptcy or with 
the closure of the firm. For this reason workers can reasonably anticipate that 
should the firm break a promise to give advance notice it would have something 
to lose, either in the courts or by way of loss of reputation. Nor is it clear 
that there need be much ambiguity about what constitutes a violation; that is, 
noncompliance should be relatively easy for (current and future) participants and 
third parties to confirm. 
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hazard on the part of workers. Take as the comparator the best available 
no-notice contract for the firm. Adding notice would increase the quit 
rate at the given wage, thereby decreasing the profit of the firm. We can 
infer that, because the information has an influence on the quit decision, 
the worker gains. To undo the adverse effect that information has on 
quits, the firm could of course raise the wage, but this response also yields 
lower profits than the original no-notice contract. 
Another possibility is to provide notice and cut wages. Suppose that 
without this wage cut the gain to workers from notice exceeds the loss 
to the firm. The firm would now voluntarily furnish notice because there 
must exist a wage cut that would compensate it. If, however, the gain to 
workers does not exceed the loss to the firm, we have the conditions 
necessary to lead to the adoption of a no-notice contract. Surprisingly, 
these conditions are not sufficient. As was noted earlier, there exist cases 
in which the firm would still voluntarily offer a notice contract. This 
particular result is due to a monopsony effect: giving notice lowers the 
supply elasticity of labor retained and may create the incentive for the 
firm to trim wages. Perfectly analogous to conventional monopsony anal- 
ysis, this notice contract is inefficient in the sense that there exist alterna- 
tive contracts under which the winners could notionally compensate the 
losers. 
The model is presented in the next section. Contracts yielding efficient 
retention are developed in Section III. Equilibrium is the subject of Sec- 
tion IV, leading to an evaluation of the consequences of a mandate in 
Section V. Robustness of the results with respect to bargaining power 
and contract flexibility is considered in Section VI, while the empirical 
content of the model is addressed in Section VII. Section VIII concludes. 
II. The Model 
There are two players, the firm and the worker. For simplicity, future 
cash flows are not discounted, and both the firm and the worker are 
assumed to be risk neutral. Players are equally ignorant at the outset, 
sharing common knowledge of the structure and parameters of the game 
(U, v, p, r, w), defined below. Bargaining is also of the simplest kind. The 
firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract offer that the worker can either 
accept or reject.2 Rejection terminates the game, yielding the firm a payoff 
of zero and the worker his reservation utility U > 0 where the latter is 
taken to be the market value of alternative employment.3 
2 The case in which the worker makes the offer is considered in Sec. VI. 
A positive opportunity cost for the firm could be easily introduced. In this 
case, in addition to its potential for distorting quits, mandated notice can be 
shown to lead to an inefficiently low level of employment. 
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Immediately following acceptance of its offer, the firm privately learns 
whether it is to be permanent (P) or temporary (T): the state is P with 
probability p E [0, 1]. The game then enters a 2-period phase of real 
activity (either in production within the firm or in employment outside 
it, or in unemployment) after which the game ends. The value of the 
worker's marginal product is v > 0 in each period the worker remains 
with the firm. 
For the worker who has accepted a contract, outside offers paying w 
> 0 per period arrive just prior to the start of each period. The probability 
of receiving an outside offer just prior to any period is r E [0, 1]. Any 
outside offer that arrives prior to the first period, a first-period outside 
offer, is assumed for simplicity to be for a 2-period term of employment. 
A second-period outside offer is for 1 period of employment. The worker 
cannot hold on to outside offers. To take an outside offer the worker 
must immediately quit. Accordingly, the worker's tenure with the firm 
will be 0, 1, or 2 periods. The worker is with the firm for 0 periods if he 
or she quits at the start of the first period to accept an outside offer. The 
employment relation may end after 1 period either because the worker 
quits at the start of the second period or because the firm is temporary. 
The worker's tenure is 2 periods if the firm is permanent and he or she 
does not quit. 
With slavery outlawed, a contract can bind a worker to the firm only 
by providing the incentive to stay. The worker will simply quit if he has 
an outside offer that is more attractive than staying with the firm. The 
incentives the firm can provide are a set of ordered pairs (x, w). x E {AN, 
NN}, where AN denotes an advance-notice contract and NN a no-notice 
contract. The AN contract is a binding commitment by the firm to inform 
the worker immediately if the state is T. The worker is informed in 
sufficient time to accept any outside offer of employment. The term w 
is the contract wage, the per-period wage offered by the firm as long as 
the worker stays with the firm and the plant has not closed. Notice that 
any equilibrium contract must have the feature that v - w, the firm's 
profit in any period, be nonnegative. Thus, once a contract has been 
accepted, the firm will prefer that it be perceived to be permanent because 
this will tend to discourage premature quits. The assumption that the 
firm can make binding commitments to provide notice is not redundant 
for precisely this reason. 
Note that contracting costs do play a role in our explanation for no- 
notice contracts. A no-notice contract (at an adequate wage) is a particu- 
larly simple arrangement for retaining the worker in all states. As is shown 
in Section VI, if we allowed for more complex contingent contracts, the 
quit behavior under a no-notice contract could be replicated at the same 
expected cost by an advance-notice contract. One such advance-notice 
contract would make the wage contingent on the firm's type, paying 
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more when the firm is temporary. Furthermore, any quit behavior ob- 
tained under an invariant-wage, advance-notice contract could be pur- 
chased at lower cost with a state-contingent wage contract. This latter 
possibility would enhance the appeal of advance-notice arrangements to 
firms. Because few workers report receiving formal notice of plant clo- 
sure, however, we are led to conclude that there are transactions costs of 
writing and administering these more complex contracts.4 Alternatively, 
the firm promising notice could pay a high but noncontingent wage to 
bind the worker. But this is more costly to the firm unless it also extracts 
an up-front lump-sum payment from the worker. Such arrangements are 
rare. Up-front payments are circumscribed not only by liquidity con- 
straints but also because they attract firms whose sole interest is to take 
the money and run. 
III. Quit Behavior and Joint-Value-Maximizing Contracts 
A. Quit Rules 
The equilibrium of the game will be found in conventional backward- 
induction fashion. Thus, as a prelude to determining that full equilibrium 
in Section IV, we begin with rational quit behavior under any given 
contract so as to determine the value of alternative contracts to the firm 
and the worker. Note at the outset that second-period quit behavior is 
trivial: the worker with an outside offer quits if and only if w < A. (We 
shall decide the situation of worker indifference, here and elsewhere, in 
favor of staying with the firm.) 
Under an NN contract, the worker with a first-period outside offer is 
indifferent about quitting when 
2 = w + pw +(1-p)ra. (1) 
The value 2w is the payoff to the worker from an outside offer of guaran- 
teed employment for 2 periods at the outside wage a. The expected value 
to the worker of staying is w + pw + (1 - p)ro: employment at contract 
wage w is assured for the first period, while in the second period the 
worker faces the risk of plant closure, which results either in employment 
at the lower outside wage (indifference implies w < w) or in unemploy- 
4 Backloaded compensation might also be used as an alternative to state-contin- 
gent wages. But this creates room for malfeasance. Imagine a continuous-time 
model in which the worker could quit at any time within the notice period. A 
worker who, during this interval, quits or is fired for slack performance has the 
incentive to claim that the firm fired him to avoid paying severance. The resulting 
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FIG. 1.-The W(p) function 
ment (the value of leisure is zero). Equation (1) defines a critical value of 
w, which is convenient to think of as a function of p: 
W(p) --[2 -(1 -p)r] + (1 + p). 
Under a no-notice contract, the worker with a first-period outside offer 
will quit if the contract wage w is less than W(p). Evaluation of W(-) at 
p = 0 and p = 1 yields critical values under an AN contract when the 
firm is, respectively, T or P. For future reference these values are 
W(O) = (2 - r) 
and 
W(1) w 
The value W(p) is monotonically decreasing in p, so 0 < W(l) c W(p) 
W(O) for 0 -p c 1. Figure 1 illustrates these properties of W(p). 
Contracts can be usefully classified into the quit rules they induce. 
There are three such categories: given a first-period outside offer, the 
worker's quit rule is to (1) always quit, (2) quit only if the firm is type 
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Table 1 
Expected Value of Contract Type NN 
Contract Type Expected Value 
Always quit: J(NN, w) r2w + (1 - r)[v + rw + (1 -r)pv] 
w < W(1) u(NN, w) r2w + (1 - r)[w + rw + (1 - r)pw] 
it(NN, w) rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + (1 - r)p(v - w)] 
Always quit (first-period only): J(NN, w) r2w + (1 - r)[v + pv + (1-p)rw] 
W(1) c w < W(p) u(NN, w) r2w + (1 - r)[w + pw + (1 - p)rw] 
n(NN, w) rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + p(v - w)] 
Never quit: J(NN, w) v + pv + (1 - p)rw 
w- W(p) u(NN, w) wz+ pwz+ (1 -p)rw 
it(NN, w) (v - w)+ p(v - w) 
T (which we shall term the contingent-quit rule), or (3) never quit. For 
example, referring to figure 1, the contract (AN, w') is a contingent-quit 
contract because W(1) c w' < W(O). The worker with a first-period 
outside offer would quit if informed that the firm is type T but would 
stay if it is of type P. Whether the contract (NN, w') achieves a never- 
quit or an always-quit allocation depends on p. In figure 1, at p = p", 
W(p") > w'. Under the contract (NN, w'), therefore, if p = p", a worker 
with a first-period offer would always leave the firm. 
The following result is immediate: 
LEMMA 1. Self-enforcing contracts. Any (NN, w) contract with w 
< W(p) or any (AN, w) contract with w < W(1) is an always-quit con- 
tract. Any (AN, w) contract with W(1) c w < W(O) is a contingent-quit 
contract. Any (AN, w) contract with w 2 W(O), or (NN, w) contract 
with w 2 W(p), is a never-quit contract. Further, if and only if w < W(l), 
a second-period offer will result in a quit. 
Given these quit rules, the value of alternative contracts can be deter- 
mined. These values are presented in table 1 for NN contracts and in 
table 2 for AN contracts. We use u(x, w) to signify the worker's payoff 
over the 2 periods from contract (x, w), while J(x, w) denotes the value 
of contract (x, w) to the firm. 
B. Joint-Value-Maximizing Contracts 
Also included in tables 1 and 2 is the sum of u(x, w) and J(x, w), 
namely, the joint value of contract (x, w), denoted by J(x, w). We will 
subsequently use the joint-value maximum as a device in solving for 
the equilibrium contract offered by the firm. Here we begin that task, 
determining which contracts are joint-value maximizing. 
The contract (AN, v) gives the worker all the value and all the informa- 
tion. It is therefore joint-value maximizing because the worker would 
always take the quit action that enhances joint value. Note the implication: 
permitting contracts that dictate the worker's course of action would 
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Table 2 
Expected Value of Contract Type AN 
Contract Type Expected Value 
Always quit: J(AN, w) = r2w + (1 - r)[v + rw + (1 - r)pv] 
W < W(1) u(AN, w) =r2w + (1 - r)[w + r? + (1 -r)pw] 
it(AN, w) = rO + (1 - r)[(v - w) + (1- r)p(v -w)] 
Contingent quit: J(AN, w) p2v + (1 - p)[r2w + (1 - r)(v + rw)] 
W(1) c w < W(O) u(AN, w) - p2w + (1 - p)[r2w + (1 - r)(w + rw)] 
it(AN, w) p2(v - w) + (1 -p)[rO + (1 - r)(v - w)] 
Never quit: J(AN, w) =p2v + (1 -p)[v + r] = v + pv + (1 - p)r 
W 2 W(O) u(AN, w) =p2w + (1 - p)[w + rw] =w + pw + (1 - p)rw 
it(AN, w) p2(v - w) + (1 - p)[v - w] = (v - w) + p(v - w) 
create no further improvement in joint value. A corollary to lemma 1 
characterizes the entire set of joint-value-maximizing (JVM) contracts: 
COROLLARY. JVM contracts. Always-quit contracts induce JVM 
first-period quit behavior if and only if v c W(1). Contingent-quit con- 
tracts induce JVM first-period quit behavior if and only if W(1) c v 
c W(O). Never-quit contracts induce JVM first-period quit behavior if 
and only if W(O) c v. For v c W(1), second-period quit behavior is JVM 
if and only if w c W(1). For v 2 W(1), second-period quit behavior 
under a contract (x, w) is JVM if and only if w 2 W(1). No other contracts 
are JVM with regard to quit behavior. 
Proof Lemma 1 can be employed to determine JVM quits. Specifi- 
cally, take the joint value from any arbitrary sequence of events. The 
payoff to the worker from this same sequence of events is the same as 
the joint value other than in the replacement of w by v in the worker's 
payoff. In contrast to lemma 1, the inequalities are weak because where 
there is indifference there is more than one class of JVM contracts. Q.E.D. 
Together the corollary and lemma 1 imply that, despite the limitations 
on the set of feasible contracts, advance notice is not always necessary to 
achieve the joint-value maximum. Specifically, if v 2 W(O), any contract 
with w 2 W(O) will achieve the joint-value-maximizing never-quit alloca- 
tion; if v c W(1), any contract with w c W(1) will achieve the joint- 
value-maximizing always-quit allocation. 
But might not firms refuse to offer advance-notice contracts when 
these are the only means of achieving joint-value maximization? In what 
follows, we shall evaluate equilibrium contracts and government man- 
dated notice in terms of the criterion of joint value. We do find that there 
exist circumstances in which joint-value maximization is not achieved in 
equilibrium, but in each such instance an advance-notice contract (or its 
equivalent) is the culprit. It is immediate that a notice mandate can only 
reduce joint value. 
IV. Equilibrium Contracts 
Since by assumption the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, the 
determination of equilibrium contracts reduces to the solution to the 
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following optimization problem for the firm: 
max it(x, w) subject to u(x, w) 2 U. (2) 
x,w 
The participation constraint, u(x, w) 2 U, indicates that the worker will 
not accept a contract unless it is at least as valuable as the best alternative 
u. If and only if u(AN, v) 2 u will there exist contracts acceptable to 
the worker that yield the firm a nonnegative expected return. We adopt 
the convention that if no such contract exists then no contract is offered. 
Clearly, the firm and worker agree to a match if and only if it is efficient 
for the match to form. However, as we shall see, this does not imply that 
equilibrium contracts will necessarily create incentives for joint-value- 
maximizing quit behavior. 
Lemma 2 shows that certain contracts will never be offered. Note that 
these contracts are those found in the middle panel of table 1. 
LEMMA 2. A contract (NN, w) with W(1) < w < W(p) is never an 
equilibrium contract. 
Proof. Comparing contracts (NN, w) and (AN, w), where W(1) < w 
< W(p), the worker with the (AN, w) contract will avoid the error of 
quitting in state P. Thus, the worker strictly prefers the (AN, w) contract. 
In equilibrium w c v, so the (AN, w) contract will be preferred by the 
firm as well. Q.E.D. 
To streamline the presentation, we will concentrate on the special case 
in which u equals u(AN, 0) or, equivalently, u(NN, 0).5 The general case 
is relegated to the appendix. The firm can narrow its choice of contract 
to three alternatives. These are (1) a least-cost always-quit contract, either 
(AN, 0) or (NN, 0); (2) the least-cost contingent-quit contract (AN, w); 
and (3) the least-cost never-quit contract (NN, W(p)). No other contract 
can be a solution to problem (2). 
It is convenient to think of the firm as residual claimant, with the 
expected cost to the residual claimant of a contract (x, w) equaling the 
worker's expected earnings u(x, w). That is, the firm's payoff is just 
i(x, w) = J(x, w) - u(x, w). We begin, then, by determining the worker's 
ranking of the three relevant alternatives. 
The least-cost contingent-quit contract (AN, w) pays a wage matching 
the outside wage w, leaving the worker indifferent between staying with 
a permanent firm and accepting an outside offer. The worker's earnings 
are 2w when the firm is permanent or when the worker receives an outside 
offer (in any period). Otherwise-that is, when the firm is temporary 
5An alternative interpretation is that the participation constraint is replaced by 
the constraint that the wage be nonnegative. 
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and the worker does not find outside employment-the worker earns 
only A. Thus, the worker's expected earnings from (AN, w) are less than 
2o). It is obvious that u(NN, 0) = u(AN, 0) < u(AN, C)). 
The least-cost means of always retaining the worker is to offer a no- 
notice contract at the wage W(p) that leaves the worker indifferent be- 
tween staying with the firm, not knowing its type, and accepting an 
outside offer. That wage as we have seen exceeds w because, in comparison 
to a contingent-quit contract, a never-quit contract must compensate the 
worker for the error of staying with a firm that turns out to be temporary. 
The worker's indifference implies that his expected value from the least- 
cost never-quit contract is 2w), namely, the earnings possible from an 
outside offer. 
To summarize, the worker's rankings are u(NN, W(p)) = 2w) > u(AN, 
w) > u(AN, 0) = u(NN, 0). These results can be readily checked directly 
by referring to tables 1 and 2. 
Turning to the firm's rankings, consider first the case where only a 
contingent-quit contract maximizes J. The conventional wisdom sug- 
gests that, absent a mandate, most firms will provide too little informa- 
tion to workers with the result that retention rates are higher than 
they should be. But will the firm ever choose a never-quit contract, 
the contract that would result in fewer quits than is joint-value max- 
imizing? No. The reasoning is straightforward. Compared to the least- 
cost efficient contract, the size of the pie, J, would be smaller and the 
worker is better off-the residual left to the firm would be smaller. 
Thus, contrary to the standard view, any departure from joint-value 
maximization will be in the direction of creating too many rather than 
too few quits. The firm will offer either the least-cost contingent-quit 
contract or a least-cost always-quit contract. Recall that the former is 
an advance-notice contract and that the provision of notice is irrelevant 
in the latter case. 
In the case where only a never-quit contract is joint-value maximizing, 
the logical possibilities are that the firm provides either a never-quit 
contract or a contract that results in quits. The latter contracts shrink the 
size of the joint payoff, but since they give the worker less the firm's 
residual may actually increase. Note that where the firm offers a never- 
quit contract, the least-cost contract it offers is a no-notice contract. 
The third case is transparent. If an always-quit contract maximizes joint 
value, the firm captures all the surplus by offering a least-cost always- 
quit contract. 
We can summarize these results as follows: 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose there is no participation constraint. Equi- 
librium contracts either maximize joint value or create more quits than is 
joint-value maximizing. Any equilibrium contract that does not maximize 
joint value is (or is equivalent to) an advance-notice contract. 
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FIG. 2.-The case of W(1) < v < W(O) 
Figure 2 gives a graphical presentation of the proposition for the case 
W(1) ? v < W(O) in which, from the corollary, a contingent-quit contract 
is necessary to maximize surplus. The three parallel lines are loci along 
whichJ = X + u is constant. AlongJcQ the joint value equals that obtained 
if the worker follows contingent-quit behavior. The other two loci, JNQ 
and JAQ, are defined in similar fashion-each lies below JCQ in the case 
under consideration. The heavy segments indicate feasible allocations of 
X and u.6 To obtain contingent-quit behavior, an advance-notice contract 
paying between W(1) and W(O) is required. The heavy segment alongJcQ 
thus ends at allocation C, which corresponds to the contract (AN, W(1)). 
The worker with a first-period outside offer will quit even in the perma- 
nent state if the wage falls below W(1). The resulting allocations belong 
to the heavy segment on JAQ. Never-quit behavior can be obtained with 
a no-notice contract paying at least W(p). From the result that u(NN, 
W(p)) > u(AN, W(1)), allocation N in figure 2 must lie to the northwest 
of C: as previously noted, the firm will not offer a contract that causes 
6 There are additional feasible outcomes not indicated (those from the middle 
panel of table 1), but we have already established via lemma 2 that these are 
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FIG. 3.-Equilibrium contracts when W(O) < v 
fewer quits than is joint-value maximizing. However, as is illustrated in 
the figure, the firm may prefer the least-cost always-quit contract associ- 
ated with allocation A to its most preferred contingent-quit allocation at 
C. The equilibrium allocation is at A. Quits will be excessive. Joint surplus 
is not maximized because the increment in J moving from A to C is not 
enough to compensate the firm for the increment to u it must pay. 
In figure 3 the locus JNQ is farthest out, indicating that never-quit 
contracts maximize joint value. Again, point N corresponds to the con- 
tract (NN, W(p)), while point C corresponds to the least-cost contingent- 
quit contract (AN, co). In the figure the firm prefers N to C. If only 
advance-notice contracts were available to the firm, the least-cost never- 
quit contract would be (AN, W(O)) associated with point N'. If N' is to 
the northwest of C, then the firm would choose C. In other words, figure 
3 demonstrates that the feasibility of no-notice contracts may make it 
attractive for firms to undo the distortion caused by the inability of the 
workers to commit to indentured servitude. 
Further, the figure also illustrates the potential for monopsony ineffi- 
ciency. In particular, it is possible that the point corresponding to the 
contract (NN, W(p)) is not N, but rather N", which is located to the 
northwest of C. In these circumstances, the firm will now select the 
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contingent-quit contract (AN, co) rather than choose a joint-value-max- 
imizing contract. 
The effect of a participation constraint is to push the firm in the direc- 
tion of joint-value maximization. For instance, in figure 2 at the reserva- 
tion utility u' the equilibrium becomes the joint-value-maximizing con- 
tract C instead of the contract A. Figure 3 can likewise easily be deployed 
to show that a tightening of the participation constraint can convert the 
equilibrium from an advance-notice arrangement that does not maximize 
joint value to a no-notice equilibrium that does. The reader interested in 
the effect of the participation constraint is referred to the appendix. 
V. Mandates 
Consider the effects of a government mandate requiring advance notice. 
We will compare the pre- and postmandate equilibrium in terms of the 
joint value created and its distribution between the firm and the worker. 
Note we are not abrogating the notice conditions of an existing contract 
but, rather, comparing the equilibrium contracts across alternative 
regimes. 
A notice mandate simply restricts the opportunity set of the firm in 
problem (2). It cannot therefore make the firm better off. Under what 
conditions does a notice mandate have an effect on equilibrium? The 
notice mandate eliminates from the firm's opportunity set only those 
outcomes associated with the no-notice contracts offering w E [W(p), 
W(1)). Every other contract either is an advance-notice contract or, be- 
cause the contract wage is such that information has no value to the 
worker, is equivalent to an advance-notice contract.7 All such no-notice 
contracts without an advance-notice equivalent are never-quit contracts. 
From proposition 1 (and, more generally, proposition Al), never-quit 
contracts are used only if they are joint-value maximizing. We therefore 
have: 
PROPOSITION 2. Joint value in the unrestricted equilibrium is greater 
than or equal to joint value in the equilibrium under a notice mandate. 
Not only is it impossible in this model for all parties to gain from a 
notice mandate, it is also impossible for the gains of the winners to exceed 
the losses of the losers. 
When the mandate constraint is binding, a never-quit contract becomes 
less profitable: the wage has to be larger to provide the incentive not to 
quit when the firm is temporary. The always-quit and contingent-quit 
contract alternatives are unaffected by the mandate. Where the firm never- 
Refer back to tables 1 and 2. The always-quit panels are identical. Contingent- 
quit contracts are advance-notice contracts. Further, the never-quit panels overlap 
for w 2 W(p). 
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theless continues to favor a never-quit contractual arrangement, the effect 
of the mandate is to benefit the worker at the expense of the firm. Joint 
value is unaffected. If, however, the firm's preference is changed in favor 
of a contingent-quit or always-quit arrangement, joint value declines as 
a result of excessive quits. Further, recall that the least-cost never-quit 
contract is preferred by the worker to the least-cost always-quit and 
contingent-quit contracts. It follows that there are two possibilities if the 
notice mandate alters the firm's choice of contracts: either the participa- 
tion constraint was slack to begin with (i.e., in the premandate equilib- 
rium), in which case the worker's utility is now less than heretofore,8 
or the participation constraint was binding, leaving the worker's utility 
unchanged. These results are summarized in proposition 3. 
PROPOSITION 3. Assume the notice mandate is binding. Never-quit 
contracts maximize joint value. The mandate lowers the value of the firm. 
The premandate equilibrium contract is a never-quit no-notice contract. 
The postmandate equilibrium contract is one of the following: (i) a never- 
quit contract that the worker prefers, or (ii) an always-quit or contingent- 
quit contract that for the worker is either inferior to or as good as the 
premandate equilibrium contract. 
Proposition 3 says that if the notice mandate has an effect, it is either 
purely redistributive with the gain to the worker equaling the loss to the 
firm or it harms the firm and possibly the worker. Figure 3 can be used 
to illustrate the latter case. Allocation N is the unrestricted equilibrium 
allocation, which achieves joint-value-maximizing never-quit behavior 
with the no-notice contract (NN, W(p)). If the firm is constrained to 
offer notice, its best never-quit contract is associated with allocation N'. 
However, in the situation illustrated, that firm will choose the contingent- 
quit allocation C that is inferior to the unrestricted equilibrium allocation 
N for both parties. 
Finally, table 3 provides some examples where the notice mandate is 
binding and shows that possibilities in proposition 3 are nonempty. The 
parameter values used are p = 0.5, r = 0.6, Co = 2, and v = 3. The 
maintained parameter values imply that W(p) = 2.267, W(O) = co(2 - r) 
= 2.8, u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, and u(NN, W(p)) = 2&o = 4. A maximum 
joint value of 5.1 is implied. The joint value under a contingent-quit AN 
contract is 5.04. 
In the table various values of u are considered, just three of which are 
amplified here, beginning with u = 3.95. In the absence of a mandate, 
the firm would choose a joint-value-maximizing never-quit NN contract: 
the value of the firm would be 1.1. We can then infer that the worker 
would earn a rent of .05 (that is, 5.1 - 3.95 - 1.1). The largest value of 
8 And is the sole outcome for u = u(NN, 0). 
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Table 3 
Adoption of Notice Contracts That Are Not Joint-Value Maximizing 
(JVM): W(O) c V 
Parameter Values: p = 0.5, r = 0.6, o. = W(1) = 2, v = 3 
Endogenous Values: W(p) = 2.267, W(0) = o(2 - r) = 2.8, 
u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, u(NN, W(0)) = 2o = 4 
Largest Value of Firm: 
Under JVM 
Under Under AN Contract Under NN 
Contracts Contracts with When Notice Contracts 
u with w < W(1) w 2 W(1) Is Mandated That Are JVM 
3.00 1.32 -t 1.20 .30 1.1 
3.50 .82 1.20 t .30 1.1 
3.95 .27 1.09t .30 1.1 
4.00 .32 1.04t .30 1.1 
4.50 0 .54t .30 .60- 
4.75 0 .29 .30t .35" 
5.00 0 .04 .10:t .10 -t 
Equilibrium contract without notice mandate. 
t Equilibrium contract with notice mandate. 
the firm under an AN contract is 1.09, but this contract is not joint-value 
maximizing. Since u = 3.95 > u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84 and this AN contract 
does not maximize joint value, we can infer that the worker will just 
obtain his reservation utility if notice is mandated. In this case, the man- 
date harms not only the firm but also the worker. 
Next consider u = 4.5. Absent the mandate, the firm would choose a 
never-quit NN contract, thereby maximizing joint value: the value of the 
firm would be 0.6. From this we can infer that the worker just earns his 
reservation utility u (since 5.1 - 4.5 - 0.6 = 0). The largest value of the 
firm under an AN contract is .54, but this contract does not maximize 
joint value. Given u = 4.5 > u(AN, W(1)) = 3.84, and that joint value 
is not maximized, we can infer that where notice is mandated the worker 
obtains just his reservation utility. Only the firm is harmed; for the 
worker, the wage is reduced by an amount that exactly offsets the value 
of notice. 
Finally, for u = 4.75, the firm would again choose a joint-value-max- 
imizing never-quit NN contract: the value of the firm would be 0.35. 
From this we can infer that the worker would earn no rent (5.1 - 4.75 
- 0.35 = 0). The largest value of the firm under a joint-value-maximizing 
never-quit AN contract is 0.3. This is also the equilibrium contract under 
the mandate. (Having lost NN contracts as a binding mechanism, the 
firm substitutes the higher wage never-quit contract (AN, W(0)).) Since 
the contract is joint-value maximizing, the worker's utility under this 
contract must be 5.1 - 0.3 = 4.8 > 4.75 = u. Only the firm is harmed; 
the worker benefits. 
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VI. Robustness 
In this section we examine the robustness of our results to changes in 
certain key assumptions and offer some further justification for them. 
We have assumed a simple bargaining framework where the firm makes 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If instead the worker makes the offer, he or 
she will always capture all the potential joint value by demanding the 
contract (AN, v). Under this contract the worker would receive all the 
marginal product, and quit decisions would be on the basis of the worker's 
lifetime marginal product from staying with the firm vis-A-vis that from 
taking an outside offer. Joint value would always be maximized. Ex- 
tending the model to include a constraint for the firm's participation 
moves the results back into line with those where the firm makes the offer. 
In particular, suppose that the joint-value-maximizing contract form is 
never-quit and that the firm must earn at least nt > nt(AN, W(O)) to cover 
its fixed costs. The contract (AN, v) is joint-value maximizing but would 
be unacceptable to the firm. If a mutually acceptable contract exists, it is 
either an efficient no-notice contract or a contract resulting in excessively 
low retention. 
Return to the original bargaining framework, but now allow for lump- 
sum transfers. The firm could capture all of the potential surplus by in 
effect selling the firm to the worker-offering the contract (AN, v), 
always efficient by the corollary, in return for a lump-sum payment equal 
to the maximum joint value net of the worker's reservation utility u. It 
will always be rational for the firm to offer an advance-notice contract 
that maximizes joint value. Therefore, departures from joint-value maxim- 
ization (with or without the mandate) vanish when lump-sum transfers 
are permitted. Further, the notice mandate cannot be redistributive. The 
mandate is completely emasculated. But as noted in the introduction, 
such lump-sum payments from worker to firm, and similar forms of 
posting bond, are rare. 
Next, suppose the contract wage can depend on whether the firm is 
permanent or temporary. Such contracts are described by the 3-tuple 
(X, Wp, WT), where wp and WT are state-contingent wages. (By definition, 
WP = WT under a no-notice contract.) Contingent-quit contracts become 
less costly for the firm to implement. To deter quits in the permanent 
state requires wp be at least equal to co in the permanent state. But WT 
can be set below co if deterring quits in the temporary state is not a goal. 
The cost of a never-quit contract is not changed by the freedom to make 
wages contingent on the state of the firm. This is patently true when 
the participation constraint binds. But it is also true if the participation 
constraint is slack: the worker has to be made indifferent between quitting 
and not quitting, regardless of the contractual notice provisions. Thus, 
the worker must be guaranteed an expected utility of 2co: this is the cost 
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to the firm. The contract (NN, W(p), W(p)) will meet this condition. So, 
too, will the contract (AN, co, W(0)), where in contrast to the contingent- 
quit discussion, the wage is now greater in the temporary state than in 
the permanent state. Unlike the basic model, it follows that every no- 
notice contract-now including the never-quit variety-can be dupli- 
cated by an advance-notice contract through an appropriate choice of wp 
and WT. 
Since any no-notice contract can be duplicated by a contract (AN, wp, 
WT) for appropriate choice of wp and WT, the effect of state-contingent 
wage contracts is to emasculate a notice mandate. The firm can negotiate 
around its effects. Lazear (1990) makes a similar point. But also like 
Lazear we are skeptical of a model in which mandates have no real effects. 
Our view is that transactions costs largely preclude complex, state-contin- 
gent contracts.9 
VII. Empirical Predictions 
What conditions-in terms of the underlying parameters of the 
model-make advance-notice contracts likely in equilibrium? Here we 
provide a brief description of the model's empirical content.'0 
It has been established that the parameter space can be partitioned into 
three nonintersecting regions corresponding to whether the always-quit 
contract (NN, 0), the contingent-quit contract (AN, co), or the never- 
quit contract (NN, W(p)) characterizes equilibrium. The firm will be 
indifferent between the never-quit and the contingent-quit contract when 
(1 + p)v-2o + (1--p)r(o = [2p + (1-p)(1-r)](v-&(). (3) 
Note in particular that, independent of pA condition (3) holds when r 
= c/v. The firm is indifferent between the contingent-quit and the al- 
ways-quit contract when 
[2p + (1 -p)(1 - r)](v- o) = (1-r)(1 + (1 - r)p)v (4) 
Absence of state-contingent wage contracts need not be evidence of conven- 
tional transaction costs. In an environment in which the parties are asymmetrically 
informed at the outset, the choice of contract by the informed party has the 
potential to reveal private information. Achieving such separation typically re- 
quires contracts with state-contingent payments. But, if the information will also 
later be used to the informed party's detriment, separating contingent contracts 
are unlikely to occur. See Kuhn (1994) for an example of a model related to the 
context of plant closure and early quits. 
'? We have shown that a tighter participation constraint pushes the firm that 
would otherwise offer an always-quit contract in the direction of a contingent-quit 
contract. Further, if o/v - 1 then always-quit contracts will be the equilibrium 
arrangement. In what follows, therefore, it is assumed that u = u(NN, 0) and 
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FIG. 4.-Equilibrium partition for (0/v = .75 
and between the never-quit and always-quit contracts when 
(1 + p)v - 2o + (1 -p)r(o = (1- r)(1 + (1- r)p)v. (5) 
All three conditions of indifference are met simultaneously if and only 
if p = .5 and r = 0/v. Both (4) and (5) imply an inverse relationship 
between r and p. It can also be shown that at p < .5, the value of r 
required to satisfy (4) is greater than that to satisfy (5), while the reverse 
is true for p > .5. It is further helpful to note that at (r, p) = (1, 0), 
condition (4) is satisfied. 
Figure 4 illustrates these relationships using the value co/v = .75. The 
three contracts are the never-quit contract N, the contingent-quit contract 
C, and A, denoting the always-quit contract. Along the locus NC the 
firm is indifferent between never-quit and contingent-quit contracts. The 
loci CA and NA are similarly defined mnemonically. For each locus the 
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first (second) letter refers to which of the two contracts is preferred in 
the region above (below) the locus. In the intersection of the regions 
below CA and NA, the firm will offer the always-quit contract (NN, 0) 
or its equivalent (AN, 0). In the region above CA and below NC, the 
firm offers the contingent-quit contract (AN, co). The equilibrium is the 
never-quit contract (NN, W(p)) in the intersection of the regions above 
NA and NC. 
Using figure 4, the empirical predictions of the model become transpar- 
ent. Consider the region p < .5. As is evident from the figure, under this 
condition the firm will never offer the contingent-quit contract, the only 
interesting advance-notice contract. In the area to the right of p = .5 there 
emerges the wedge-shaped region bounded by CA and NC in which the 
firm offers advance notice to achieve the contingent-quit arrangement. 
For each value of p > .5, there is an interval of r values within which 
the equilibrium is a contingent-quit advance-notice contract. The upper 
bound of this interval is always r = 0o/v. The lower bound falls with an 
increase in p. The lower the chance of plant closure, therefore, the more 
likely is a contingent-quit advance-notice contract. 
Finally, consider the effect of increasing the outside offer co relative to 
the value of marginal product v. It is easily confirmed that when c0/v 
- 1 the three indifference loci collapse to r = 1. This suggests that the 
contingent-quit region would shrink monotonically with an increase in 
0o/v. Using numerical methods, we established this is indeed the case. 
To summarize, we would expect contingent-quit advance-notice con- 
tracts where a small to moderate probability of plant closure is combined 
with a probability of an outside offer that is close to but below the ratio 
of the outside wage to the value of marginal product. The latter condition 
is least restrictive where the ratio of the outside wage to the value of 
marginal product is small. If these conditions are not met, we would 
expect to see no-notice arrangements, even if the cost of enforcing ad- 
vance-notice contracts is low. This observation sharply differentiates our 
model from competing theories. 
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
Summers (1989) makes the case that mandated benefits can be justified 
if workers value the benefit they are receiving and are prepared to pay 
its cost through lower wages. Of course, there must be a market failure 
to explain the underprovision of the benefit in the first place; a common 
example is adverse selection in health insurance. By extension, there is a 
common perception that advance notice is also underprovided. As we 
have seen, the theoretical literature on advance notice starts from this 
perspective and finds a candidate for market failure in a commitment 
problem on the part of firms. On Kuhn's (1992) analysis, if all parties 
are at the outset equally uninformed of the firm's prospects, a notice 
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mandate can benefit both the firm and the worker. The widespread oppo- 
sition on the part of business in the debate leading up to WARN (the 
Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification Act, Public Law 100- 
379) suggests to us the straightforward possibility that voluntary notice 
may be feasible but is not necessarily sufficiently valued to justify its 
provision. 
Indeed, we have shown that no-notice contracts can circumvent a po- 
tential market failure. They serve the productive purpose of binding the 
worker to the firm. There is a commitment problem, but it is on the part 
of the worker not the firm. The firm faced with a binding notice mandate 
will find in one of two alternatives the most profitable response, both of 
which are in sharp contrast to the Summers parable. The first possibility 
is to raise the wage so that the retention rate does not fall. The worker 
obtains a valuable benefit and the wage is increased, but there is no change 
in quits. The worker's gain is merely the firm's loss. The second alternative 
is to lower the wage, which is feasible precisely because the advance 
notice is valued. But this particular option exacerbates the true efficiency 
problem, namely, excessive quits. The worker pays for a valued benefit, 
yet at the same time a distortion is introduced by the form of payment. 
On the basis of our analysis, then, the case for mandated notice must rest 
on equity rather than efficiency grounds. 
The overprovision of notice which we have identified can be interpreted 
as a consequence of a market failure, a missing market for jobs. If the 
firm could put a price on jobs via a lump-sum levy, the wage is freed to 
serve the role of achieving separation efficiency, and the amount of notice 
given will always be appropriate. All the surplus can be extracted by 
selling the firm to the workers, giving them all their marginal product 
along with full information. Of course, our basic result that a mandate 
can be of no benefit still stands. But now a mandate can do no harm 
either, since it places no constraint on the firm. 
Appendix 
The Participation Constraint 
The results derived in the case u = u(AN, 0) also hold in the more 
general formulation of the participation constraint. Consider the situation 
illustrated in figure 2. In the figure, only contingent-quit contracts are 
joint-value maximizing, but at u = u(AN, 0) the equilibrium contract is 
nevertheless the always-quit contract (AN, 0) because t(AN, 0) > t(AN, 
W(1)). This offers a rich set of possibilities illustrating the potential effects 
of the participation constraint. First, if u c u(AN, 0), u is so small that 
the participation constraint does not bind. Second, where u > u(AN, 0) 
but u is sufficiently small, it will be the case that t(AN, w) > t(AN, co), 
where w satisfies u = u(AN, w). The effect of the participation constraint 
will be to increase the equilibrium contract wage but still leave it in the 
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range where the worker always quits. However, there is a critical value 
of w, call it w", where it(AN, w") = t(AN, W(t)) and w- < W(t). The 
third case, then, is u 2 u(AN, wi) and u < u(AN, W(t)): the effect 
of the constraint is to cause the firm to switch to a JVM (joint-value- 
maximizing) contingent-quit contract. This is the situation illustrated in 
figure 2, where the firm prefers allocation C to A'. Fourth, if r 2 u(AN, 
W(t)) and u c J(AN, W(t)), the equilibrium contract will be a contingent- 
quit contract, and the firm extracts all the surplus. Finally, if U > J(AN, 
W(t)), there is no contract. 
These results generalize to all cases: 
PROPOSITION Al. The only respect, if any, in which the equilibrium 
contract does not maximize joint value is that there may be insufficient 
retention. In all departures from joint-value maximization, the equilib- 
rium contract is (or is equivalent to) an advance-notice contract. Tight- 
ening the participation constraint by increasing u reduces the incidence 
of these contracts. 
Proof. The possibilities can be partitioned into four cases. First, the 
participation constraint is not binding. Second, the participation con- 
straint is binding but is slack for all JVM contracts. Third, the participa- 
tion constraint is binding but is satisfied by some, though not all, JVM 
contracts. Fourth, the participation constraint is not satisfied by any JVM 
contract. 
In the first case, the worker's utility in the equilibrium without the 
participation constraint is at least u. The participation constraint has no 
effect on equilibrium. In the fourth case, the joint value of the match is 
negative. No match should or will occur. 
If the participation constraint in the firm's problem (2) is binding and 
is violated for some JVM contracts-the third case-then the firm would 
offer the least-cost JVM contract consistent with participation. 
This leaves the second case in which the participation constraint is 
binding in (2) but is slack for all JVM contracts. Absent the constraint, 
the firm would offer a contract inducing an excessive rate of quits in 
preference to the least-cost JVM contract, with the constraint that prefer- 
ence may be reversed. Because all JVM contracts satisfy the constraint, 
it has no effect on the profitability of the JVM contract alternative. The 
participation constraint is, however, binding, thereby reducing the 
profitability of contracts that do not maximize joint value. Q.E.D. 
Using p = 0.5, r = 0.4, co = 2, v = 3, and u values of 3.1, 3.4, and 3.7, 
the interested reader can construct examples where the equilibrium is not 
JVM, where the participation constraint is slack but plays a role in ensur- 
ing the equilibrium is JVM, and where the participation constraint binds. 
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